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Abstract
This paper studies how the assignment of patents as collateral deter-
mines the savings of rms and magnies the e¤ect of innovative rents on
investment in research and development (R&D). We analyse the behaviour
of innovative rms that face random and lumpy investment opportunities
in R&D. High growth rates of innovations, possibly higher than the real
rate of interest, may be achieved despite nancial constraints. There is an
optimal level of publicly funded policy by the patent and trademark o¢ ce
that minimizes the legal uncertainty surrounding patents as collateral and
maximizes the growth rate of innovations.
Keywords: Collateral, Patents, Research and Development, Credit ra-
tioning, Growth, Innovation.
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It is the uncertainty created by this legal and regulatory structure
[in the United States] which leads to the very market imperfections
The authors thank three anonymous referees of this journal for helpful comments and con-
structive suggestions. All remaining errors are our own.
yCES (Centre dEconomie de la Sorbonne), Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne, Paris
School of Economics, 106-112 boulevard de lHôpital, 75647 Paris Cedex 13. Email:
bruno.amable@univ-paris1.fr
zCES (Centre dEconomie de la Sorbonne), Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne, Paris
School of Economics, 106-112 boulevard de lHôpital, 75647 Paris Cedex 13. Email: jean-
bernard.chatelain@univ-paris1.fr
xESCE (Ecole Supérieure du Commerce Extérieur), 10 rue Sextius Michel, 75015 Paris.
Email: kirsten.ralf@esce.fr
1
and ine¢ ciencies currently minimizing the ability to leverage the value
of intellectual property assets and consequently stunting the economic
growth of inventors and entrepreneurs,Murphy (2002) report to the
United States Patent and Trademark O¢ ce (USPTO).
1. Introduction
The practice of using a valuable patent portfolio as collateral for a debt assignment
is slowly becoming more and more important in the United States and elsewhere.1
It follows a start-up stage nanced by venture capital where the rm obtained at
least one valuable patent. After an initial public o¤ering, many innovators still lack
the capital necessary to develop new research and must turn to outside sources for
funding. For these innovative rms, there is now considerable empirical evidence
that variables related to nancing constraints such as debt/assets ratio and/or
cash ow availability are correlated with R&D investment (see Halls (2002) sur-
vey). Due to the limited availability of physical capital as collateral, innovators
face an external nance constraint. With asymmetric information on the state of
the R&D project, additionally, problems of adverse selection and moral hazard
occur. Blundell, Gri¢ th and Van Reenen (1999) explain: A more traditional in-
terpretation of the innovation-market power correlation is that failures in nancial
markets force rms to rely on their own supra-normal prots to nance the search
for innovation. The availability of internal sources of funding (deep pockets) are
useful for all forms of investment, but may be particularly important for R&D.
In the knowledge economy, wealth creation is increasingly based on innovation
that, in turn, can give rise to important intellectual property rights. For many
companies, these intellectual property rights represent their most valuable assets.
Patent-backed loans increase the availability of external funds and the return on
equity for the shareholders.
In the United States, the potential e¤ect of patent-backed loans on the growth
of innovation is estimated to be important for the following reasons. First, the
stock of potential untapped intangible collateral is by now huge. Corrado, Hulten
1Since the end of the 1990s, several IPR intermediaries services (Ocean Tomo and Patent
Ratings, M-CAM, PLX, etc.) provide valuations of patents as collateral information. The
Development Bank of Japan since 1995 and the Landesbank Rheinland-Pfalz in Germany use
patents as collateral for loans to venture rms (Kamiyama, S., J. Sheehan and C. Martinez
(2006)).
and Sichel (2006)2 estimate investment in intangible assets to be $1.2 trillion
per year for the period 2000-2003 (a level of investment that roughly equals the
gross investment in corporate tangible assets), including $230 billion in innovative
property of scientic R&D, besides innovative property of non-scientic R&D and
computer software. Depending on its depreciation rate, the stock of intangible
assets may be ve to ten times this level of investment. Second, post initial public
o¤ering (IPO) shareholders of innovative rms have a strong monetary incentive
to use patent-backed debt instead of new share issues: no dilution of capital and a
leverage multiplier e¤ect on their return on equity. Third, the patent backed loan
industry is fostered by intellectual property rights (IPR) lawyers, IPR valuation,
technology and nancial intermediaries and IPR insurance rms, who lobby for
the required legal and regulatory changes to be supported by the USPTO. Fourth,
the share of measured innovations (patents, R&D spending) by older rms owning
at least one valuable patent (that could be used as collateral) is much larger than
the one of start-ups nanced by venture capital in the United States.3 The pool
of innovative rms with new projects, likely to use patent-backed loans, is broad.
Kiyotaki and Moores (1997) and Kiyotakis (1998) seminal papers deal with
the magnifying e¤ects of collateral availability constraints in order to explain
business cycles movements. Their framework paved the way to new studies of
monetary policy and housing prices (Iacoviello (2005)) or asset prices, the credit
channel, liquidity in closed or open economies (e.g. Faia and Monacelli (2007),
Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2007), Kato (2006), Kunieda and Shibata (2005),
Moretto and Tamborini (2007), Bougheas, Mizen and Yalcin (2006), Cordoba and
Ripoll (2004), Amable, Chatelain and Ralf (2004), Chatelain (2001)). Kiyotaki
and Moores (1997) framework also tackles the issue of lumpy and irreversible
investment, leading to recent extensions by Caggese (2007) and Sveen and Weinke
(2007). Lumpiness is also an observed characteristic of R&D investment in lab
equipment (Geroski, Van Reenen and Walters (1997), Aghion et al. (2007)). But
collateral issues remained conned to business cycles theory.
This paper introduces patents as collateral in the context of expanding variety
growth models dealing with intellectual property rights (Rivera Batiz and Romer
2In their table 2.
3Kamiyama, S., J. Sheehan and C. Martinez (2006) mention that high value patents are
among the most important factors (along with good management) that venture capitalists con-
sider in their investment decisions in shares. In the pre-investment phase, the availability of
a patent might also be seen as a liquidation benet for the venture shareholders, given that
the key patents may still be sold or redistributed if the company does not succeed. See also
Keuschnigg (2004) on venture capital driven growth.
(1991), Amable et Chatelain (1995), Kwan and Lai (2003), Boucekkine and de la
Croix (2003), Donoghue and Zweimüller (2004), Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2004),
Gancia and Zilibotti (2005), Strulik (2007), Furukawa (2007)). These papers
already discussed various arguments for and against intellectual property rights
granting monopoly rights to patent holders. The novel point here is to consider the
prospective consequences of a large development of the use of patents as collateral
on economic growth, as this practice is likely to spread in the next decades.
The paper has three goals: Firstly, it provides the condition for a signicant
leverage e¤ect of the collateral assignment of patents on the growth of innovation.
It shows in particular that the dependence of innovations on past innovations
increases with innovative rents relatively more than in standard expanding variety
growth models based on R&D (Romer and Rivera Batiz (1990), Barro and Sala-
I-Martin (2004)). Secondly, it models the nancial constraints on individual rms
savings, the aggregate debt-equity ratio, and economic growth. Finally, we show
that the rate of return of innovation is higher than the credit interest rate in
a growing economy and that the growth of patents is a decreasing function of
the interest rate. This is not the case in the standard R&D endogenous growth
models. The model di¤ers from the Kiyotaki and Moores (1997) credit cycle
model in various ways: the size of the aggregate capital stock is no longer xed,
but may grow over time, and expected monopoly rents on existing patents are used
as collateral, so that they increase the value of collateral, the available amount of
loans and economic growth. The model is the rst one dealing with the assignment
of patents as collateral in the economic literature.
The model recommends an institutional policy, which has been much less advo-
cated by economists than by lawyers (Murphy (2002)), improving the laws dealing
with security interest in patents in order to greatly reduce the uncertainty sur-
rounding the use of patents as collateral. For example, the United States Patent
and Trademark O¢ ce registers transactions transferring patents to di¤erent own-
ers than the inventor, so-called assignments, in the Patent Assignments Database
(Serrano (2008)), but it does not hold a registry of collateral assignment of patents
conditional to borrowersdefault (Murphy (2002)), paving the way for increased
uncertainty of transfers of IPR. Transfers of property rights over the income of
patents should become enforceable, not only against the debtor, but also against
competing creditors at low cost. Lenders have to be protected against the bor-
rowers ability to transfer, abandon or license the patent collateral and against
the borrowers lack of continued patent maintenance, prosecution and exploita-
tion. These legal improvements are a way to rise the aggregate debt ceiling and
the growth of innovations. Moreover, the model species how such a leverage may
lead to high speed growth of the knowledge economy. A credit constraint based
on the value of already existing patents rules out Ponzi nance, so that a high
speed growth rate of innovations may exceed the interest rate on patent backed
loans in equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. The microeconomic behaviour of agents is
described in section 2. Section 3 provides the conditions for steady state aggregate
growth. Section 4 concludes the paper with a discussion of the results and related
research.
2. The model
We consider a lab-equipment model of expanding variety (Rivera-Batiz and Romer
(1991), Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2004)), which is directly related to R&D invest-
ment equations estimated in applied work (Blundell et al. (1999)). As in other
increasing product variety models (Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpmann
(1991)), the economy has three sectors of production: a nal goods sector, whose
price is taken as numeraire, an intermediate goods sector, whose output is used in
the production of the nal good and an R&D sector in which blueprints allowing
the creation of new intermediate goods are discovered.
2.1. Households
A constant population of wage-earning households is distributed on [0; L]. A
household maximizes utility over an innite time horizon:
Ut =
P+1
=0 
u(ct+ ) with u(ct) = (c1 t   1)=(1   ) for  > 0 and  6= 1 or
with u(ct) = ln (ct) for  = 1. ct  0 is consumption in t,   0 is the rate of
time preference,  = 1=(1+) is the discount rate and  is the relative uctuation
aversion. Households supply inelastically one unit of labour used in the nal goods
industry and are paid a real wage rate wt. They have no disutility of labour. They
lend to entrepreneurs and earn a rate of return rt on their wealth bht . The law of
motion of their wealth is bht = (1+rt 1)b
h
t 1+wt ct. The initial wealth bh0 is given
and identical for all households. Taking into account the optimum consumption
plan of the households, consumption growth gc is given by
1 + gc;t+1 = ct+1=ct = Ct+1=Ct = (Rt)
1
 ; (1)
where Ct = ctL denotes aggregate household consumption and Rt = 1 + rt. The
growth rate of household consumption increases with the return on savings and
decreases with the rate of time preference and with the relative uctuation aversion
.
2.2. Production of the nal good
A large number of producers of the nal good, indexed by j, operate in perfect
competition. Producer j produces the quantity Yjt according to a constant return
to scale production function:
Yjt = L
1 
jt
Z Nt
0
Xjt(i)
di with 0 <  < 1: (2)
A producer uses labour and intermediates as inputs that are fully used up within
the period. Xjt(i) is the amount of intermediate good i used by producer j on
a set fXjt(i); i 2 [0; Nt]g. Nt represents the most recently invented intermediate
good, so that the interval [0; Nt] is the variety of intermediate goods available
in the economy. The representative producer of nal goods maximizes prot
while buying intermediate goods. This leads to the following demand function for
intermediate inputs:
Xjt(i) =


pit
1=(1 )
Ljt for i 2 [0; Nt]: (3)
2.3. Production of intermediate goods
The rm producing an intermediate non-durable good, indexed by i, acts as a
monopolist selling to nal good producers at a price which adds a mark-up to
marginal costs. A rent it has to be paid to the innovator for using his blueprint
at each date t. Production of intermediate goods takes place at constant marginal
cost, normalized to 1. Taking into account the demand for intermediate inputs
(see equation (3)), the producer of an intermediate good maximizes
max
pit
it = (pit   1)
X
j
Xjt(i): (4)
The solution for the monopoly price is
pit = p =
1

> 1: (5)
Hence, the price pit is constant over time and the same for all intermediate goods
i. The aggregate quantity of each intermediary good produced and the monopoly
prot are also constant over time, whereas the aggregate level of nal output Yt is
proportional to the number of intermediate goods Nt. Output net of intermediate
goods is then:
Yt  XNt =

1

+ 1

Nt: (6)
2.4. R&D sector: technology and nance
Every period, a continuum of risk neutral entrepreneurs distributed over the inter-
val [0; 1] is engaged in the R&D activity. On date 0, each entrepreneur k receives
an initial dividend d0;k that he spends on consumption and has an initial endow-
ment of n0;k of valuable blueprints.4 The aggregate number of patents on date 0
is denoted N0 and aggregate dividends D0.
Utility is given as the expected present value V0 of dividends dt  0. Future
dividends are discounted using the market interest rate rt. E0 is the expectation
operator at date 0:
Choose nt; bt; it; dt that maxV0 = E0
"
d0 +
=+1X
=1
d
T=T=1 (1 + rT )
#
: (7)
The entrepreneur maximizes his utility. He chooses the state variables which
are the stock of patents nt and the stock of debt bt, (with given initial endowments
b0;k and n0;k) by changing the control variables: new patents it and dividends dt.
His utility is subject to constraints. First, there are two equality constraints: the
law of motion of patents derived from the innovation process, the law of motion
of debt (or net worth) derived from the ow of funds constraint. Second, there
are two inequality constraints: the saving ceiling (or minimal consumption, or
positive dividend) and the debt ceiling.
Innovation on date t depends on two factors: The entrepreneur has to have
new ideas and he has to provide his rm specic labour. The rst factor accounts
for the fact that the entrepreneur may nd a number of positive net present value
ideas leading to new valuable patents (

1it>0 = 1; where it is the number of new
blueprints obtained in a period) only with probability  (0 <   1). With prob-
ability 1   , he will have no ideas (1it>0 = 0). This factor is motivated by the
4The following model of aggregate growth of innovations holds for all types of initial distri-
butions of patents n0;k among entrepreneurs.
observation that R&D lab-equipment investment is lumpy (Geroski, Van Reenen,
Walters (1997)). The value of the random variable

1it>0 is known by the entrepre-
neur at the beginning of the period t, but is not observable for the creditor. The
second factor accounts for the fact that the entrepreneur may supply inelastically
one unit of R&D specic labour (ht = 1) in her own rm, without disutility of
labour, or withdraw her labour (ht = 0) leading to zero investment in R&D. This
assumption captures the informational asymmetry between lenders and innova-
tors describing a problem of moral hazard. It is too costly for lenders to enforce
loan repayment with an ex post assessment discriminating zero investment related
to not workingversus zero investment related to having no ideas(

1it>0 = 0).
The fact that the labour input of the entrepreneur is R&D specic and cannot
be carried out by a hired worker enables us to avoid labour sectoral allocation
problems as in Romer (1990). The stock of blueprints of the entrepreneur evolves
then according to the following equation:
nt =

1it>0  ht

 it + (1  )nt 1 (8)
where   0 is a hazard rate related to the opposition and litigation due to an
identical, close or overlapping prior innovation, so that the related intermediate
goods disappear.5
The ow of funds constraint states that dividends are equal to the prot at
date t earned from previously discovered blueprints plus new debt net of interest
repayment minus cost of investment in R&D:
dt =


q
  

qnt 1   rt 1bt 1 + bt   bt 1  

1it>0  ht

 q  (nt   nt 1) : (9)
where q is the unit cost per patent granted: the cost function of R&D investment
is linear when the entrepreneur does invest:
1it>0  ht

 q  (nt   (1  )nt 1) :
5A patent examiner must nd evidence of prior art which can be elusive. Hence, litigation
for close prior innovation is frequent when a new patent turns out to be protable. One may
also assume that some varieties would be eventually produced by competitive rms (Kwan and
Lai (2003), Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2004)), which complicates this model in adding a fourth
state variable for the stock of these varieties. The results of the model are unchanged when we
assume  = 0.
Minimal consumption constraint: Entrepreneurs consume a minimum amount
dm  0 which is written as a proportion (1   0) of rms net worth (equity).
0  1 is then the entrepreneurs savings rate. If 0 = 1, the entrepreneur may
not consume anything and we get the usual assumption that dividends are greater
than or equal to zero. Dividends have to be larger than the minimum consumption
required by the entrepreneur:
dt  dm = (1  0) (qnt 1  Rt 1bt 1)  0; (10)
where  = 1+ 
q
  (assuming a positive net return of innovation: 0    
q
< 1),
Rt 1 = 1 + rt 1.
Financing: patents as collateral. A large number of risk neutral and perfectly
competitive nancial intermediaries pool households savings in order to diversify
the risks related to the use of patents as collateral. An entrepreneur has always the
ability to threaten its creditors to withdraw his labour input (ht = 0), repudiate
his debt contract, consume at the end of the period the stock of debt bt and its
rate of return rtbt and nd other creditors for next periods (Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997)). This incentive to cheat exists as soon as the end of period value of
the stock of debt is larger than the expected value of the ow of new patents
denoted vt+1 (it): (1 + rt) bt > vt+1 (it) : In case of default, a lender receives a
random proportion, , 0    1 of the value of the collateral. The value of
the debt, therefore, should not exceed the discounted market value of the sum of
existing patents for each entrepreneur. When patents are used as collateral, the
entrepreneur has no longer an incentive to withdraw labour, because he will lose
his stream of future incomes, so that: ht = 1.
The loan to patent portfolio value =(1 + rt) depends on the Patent O¢ ce
public spending. This key assumption takes into account that lenders are not
perfectly protected against the borrowers ability to transfer, abandon or license
the patent collateral to a third party or to competing creditors at no legal costs
(Schavey, 2003; Murphy, 2002). Lenders pool patent backed loans so that they
take into account the expected proportion 0    1 of the next period value
of the current patent portfolio assigned as collateral Vt+1 (nt) when deciding the
amount to lend. When the existing patent portfolio is fairly valued, default never
occurs because lenders protect themselves by limiting the amount of the loan:6
(1 + rt) bt  Vt+1 (nt) with (11)
Vt+1 (nt) = nt
"
1 +
+1X
=1
(1  )
T=T=1 (1 + rT )
#
:
The patent portfolio nt provides its rst return nt on date t + 1. When the
collateral constraint is not binding, we assume that there is free entry into the
business of being an inventor so that any entrepreneur can pay the R&D cost qnt
to secure the net present value Vt+1
1+rt
. Free entry leads to a zero prot condition:
qnt =
Vt+1 (nt)
1 + rt
: (12)
The equilibrium interest rate with free entry is rF = 
q
  . When borrowing
constraints hinder entry, then one has:
qnt =
Vt+1 (nt)
1 + rF
<
Vt+1 (nt)
1 + rt
: (13)
The limitations on borrowing at the interest rt prevent that an innite amount of
resources would be channelled into R&D at time t. The credit constraint may be
written as a leverageor debt/patent ratio xt bounded by an endogenous ceiling
xc (the last equality holds for a steady state interest rate: rt = r):
xt =
bt
qnt
 xc = 
1 + rt
Vt+1 (nt)
qnt
= 

q (r + )
: (14)
Innovatorsbehaviour: To sum up, entrepreneurs maximize their utility, with
control variables it and dt, and state variables nt and bt, n0 and b0 given:
V0 = E0
"
d0 +
t=+1X
t=1
dt
T=tT=1 (1 + rT )
#
6This assumption corresponds to current practice. Financial and intellectual property rights
intermediaries providing patent backed loans diversify the collateral risk in pooling loans and/or
obtaining infringement enforcement insurance or defence cost reimbursement insurance from
insurance companies, such as Swiss Re and Intellectual Property Insurance Services Corporation.
subject to equality constraints
nt =

1it>0  it + (1  )nt 1;
dt =


q
  

qnt 1   rt 1bt 1 + bt   bt 1  

1it>0q (nt   nt 1) ;
and to inequality constraints
0  qntxc   bt;
0  dt   (1  0) (qnt 1  Rt 1bt 1) :
Substituting consumption from the ow of funds equation (9) into the saving
ceiling constraint (10) and using the debt ceiling constraint (14), one nds an
upper limit on the growth of innovations determined by the ceiling of internal
savings and by the debt ceiling:
(1  xc) qnt +

1it>0   1

q (nt   nt 1)  0 (qnt 1  Rt 1bt 1) : (15)
When an innovator has an opportunity to invest (

1it>0 = 1), and when x
c  1
(that is when 
q
  > rt), the above constraint does not set a ceiling on the stock
of patents nt, but a negative oor which is not constraining patents.
Condition 1: 
q
   < rt < q   .
When the interest rate satises condition 1, patents are limited by:
qnt  
0 (qnt 1  Rt 1bt 1)
1  xc : (16)
The growth rate of patents is also limited due to the collateral constraint on the
number of patents (11) and the ow of funds equation (9).
The solution of the optimization program of the entrepreneur is summarized
in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Optimal R&D Investment, Saving and Borrowing at the
Entrepreneur Level.
In each period, innovating rms can be in one of three regimes:
(i) Perfect capital market regime: rFt =

q
   . The free entry interest rate
equals the marginal gain of R&D investment.
(ii) Currently binding credit constraint regime: With probability  the inno-
vator has an opportunity to invest at date t and faces binding debt and patents
ceilings:
bt = x
cqnt =
Vt+1 (nt)
1 + rt
(17)
qnt =
0 (qnt 1  Rt 1bt 1)
1  xc : (18)
(iii) Anticipated credit constraint regime: With probability 1  , the innovator
has no opportunity to invest and saves as much as possible in order to decrease
debt. Then:
bt = qnt 1   0 (qnt 1  Rt 1bt 1) < bt 1: (19)
In regime (i), the debt ceiling never binds, debt policy does not a¤ect R&D
investment.
Financially constrained regimes (ii) and (iii) are obtained under the condition
1 that the credit interest rate is below the marginal return of R&D investment
rt <

q
  . The entrepreneur consumes his minimal level of consumption (dt =
dm). In regime (iii), the size of the patent portfolio declines due to depreciation:
nt = (1  )nt 1: (20)
If an entrepreneur has a long history of no opportunity to invest in R&D, he
may eventually become a net creditor. When an entrepreneur which has built
deep pocketsover a history of no protable ideas faces an opportunity to invest,
he invests as much as allowed by the nancial constraint due to his linear cost
function and because the marginal return on R&D exceeds the credit interest rate.
A proof of proposition 1 can be found in appendix 1.
Additional remarks: The assumption of discounting rmsdividends by the
interest rate is common to most of neo-classical and endogenous economic growth
models. This assumption leads to a straightforward comparison of the nancially
constrained growth regime with the perfect capital market growth regime of the
lab-equipment model presented in Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2004). In business
cycles models with collateral constraints, the usual assumption is to assume that
nancially constrained entrepreneurs discount the logarithm of their dividends by
a subjective discount factor denoted  distinct from households discount factor
(e.g. Iacoviello (2005)). It can be shown by using a variant of this model that
changing this assumption does not alter the results. (Appendix 2)
3. High Growth of Innovations with Collateral Constraints
In this section we will analyse the steady state solution of the above model. In
order to do this, we calculate rst the steady state aggregate debt/patent ratio
(debt and patents grow at the same rate in a steady state). Secondly, we nd
the equilibrium interest rate such that households consumption grows also at
the steady state growth rate. In what follows, we assume additionally that R&D
investment is not lumpy ( = 1).7 Then the innovator can only be in the perfect
capital market regime or in the current binding credit regime. In the latter, debt
is a linear function of the stock of patents (equation 17) at the microeconomic
level. Hence, the dynamics of aggregate debt is identical to the dynamics of
aggregate patents. The patents equations are linear in patent and debt, so that
aggregation across entrepreneurs does not require to keep track of the distribution
of the individual entrepreneurspatents and debt. Aggregate patents and debt
are denoted by capital letters Nt and Bt. Since the population of entrepreneurs
is unity, the aggregate number of patents is limited by the sum of patent ceiling
inequalities (16):
qNt  
0 (qNt 1  Rt 1Bt 1)
1  xc : (21)
The above inequality is an equality when condition 1 is fullled (nancially con-
strained regime).
Equilibrium on the nal goods market occurs if total consumption, i.e. ag-
gregate consumption of households plus aggregate consumption of entrepreneurs,
equals output in the nal goods sector net of intermediate goods minus the amount
of resources devoted to R&D activity:
Ct +Dt = Yt  NtX   q(Nt+1  Nt):
Aggregate consumption of the entrepreneur is equal to aggregate dividends and
can be expressed as a proportion of the number of patents.8 Since output net of
7The case of lumpy R&D investment ( < 1) is treated elsewhere by the authors.
8Expressing the debt level as a fraction of the debt ceiling Bt = 0x
qNt, with 0 < 0  1
and 0 = 1 in the nancially constraint regime we get:
Dt =
 
1  00

(qNt 1  Rt 1Bt 1)
Dt =
 
1  00

( Rt 10x)
1
1 + g
qNt:
intermediate goods is also proportional to the number of patents (see equation
(6)) and q(Nt+1   Nt) = qgNt, where g is the growth rate of patents, aggregate
household consumption is proportional to the number of patents. In a steady
state growth path all these aggregates therefore grow at the same constant rate.
Householdsaggregate consumption growth rate follows fromCt+1 = ((1 + rt))
1
 Ct.
The endogenous interest rate rt ensures the equality of demand and supply of
funds. When the interest rate is equal to the marginal return of innovation
rt =

q
  , the free entry steady state growth factor of patents is equal to
Nt+1=Nt = ()
1=. The growth rate is positive as long as the interest rate is
higher than the households rate of time preference. This growth level can be
reached only if it is below the maximal rate of growth of patents allowed by the -
nancial constraint when rt = q  is equal to 0. Else, the nancially constrained
growth rate prevails.
Condition 2 for nancially constrained growth:
0 < 
1


1

 1 (22)
Entrepreneurssaving rate of equity 0 is su¢ ciently low (or equivalently the en-
trepreneursrate of time preference is su¢ ciently high).9
Proposition 2: Steady State Growth Regimes
When condition 2 is not fullled, the free entry equilibrium prevails. The
interest rate is equal to the return of R&D investment and there exists a unique
steady state growth factor ()1=. When condition 2 is fullled, there exists a
unique steady state interest rate r that is lower than the marginal return on R&D
investment and there exists a unique nancially constrained steady state growth
factor G = GC (r) = GN (r).
Proof Under condition 2, an equilibrium interest rate r determines a con-
strained steady state growth rate g. The growth rate of consumption equals the
9If the householdsï¿12 relative uctuation aversion,  is equal to one, condition 2 boils down to
entrepreneurssaving rate of net worth lower than householdssaving rate of net worth: 0 < .
Although several recent papers dealing with collateral constraints assumed 0 < , in national
accounts, rmssavings rate is often higher than householdssavings rate (a key assumption of
Kaldorian models of growth and distribution (Bertola, Foellmi and Zweimüller (2006)). Here,
the entrepreneursï¿12 savings rate of net worth can be higher than households savings rate when
households relative uctuation aversion exceeds unity.
maximal growth rate of patents:
H (r) = 0

+ ( R)

1
1  xc (r)   1

  ( (1 + r))1= = 0:
As H is a continuous and strictly decreasing function of the interest rate over the
interval 
max

; 

q
  

;

q
  

; as limr!
q
 H (r) = +1 > 0
and as H


q
  

< 0 (condition 2), there exists an unique equilibrium interest
rate, corresponding to an unique strictly positive patent growth rate, according
to the intermediate value theorem.
Remark: When dividends are always zero (0 = 1), condition 2
 < ()
1


is the equivalent of a no-Ponzi-game hypothesis, ruling out chain-
letter debt nance. Chain-letter debt nance can be seen as taking ever larger
amounts of debt in order to pay o¤ the debt of the previous period plus interest.
Then, the steady state growth rate with perfect capital market is below the free
entry rate of interest rF = 
q
  . This particular no-Ponzi-game condition sets a
minimal level for the relative uctuation aversion (strictly below unity) in order
to slow down the free entry steady state growth (Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2004)),
so that chain-letter debt nance is not feasible:
  1 + ln ()
ln ()
: (23)
However, this condition on a minimal level of the relative uctuation aversion
is no longer necessary when there is a binding collateral constraint, which also
rules out chain-letter debt nance, hence proposition 3:
Proposition 3: Financially constrained growth rate higher than the
real interest rate is feasible.
A steady state nancially constrained growth rate higher than the real interest
rate is feasible because collateral backed debt rules out Ponzi nance. The col-
lateral constraints extend the set of feasible high growth rates and interest rates
currently accepted in the endogenous growth literature. Contrary to a commonly
held view, nancial constraints are compatible with high level of the growth of in-
novation, because collateral leverages growth. However, the growth rate cannot
exceed
 
1 + 1



q
, else consumption is zero.
As debt is always fully backed by a correct evaluation of the value of available
collateral at all future periods, lenders avoid repayment problems related to Ponzi
nance (see also Araujo et al. (2002)). It is not necessary to add an alternative
no-Ponzi nance condition such that, in an equilibrium, the growth rate has to be
lower than the interest rate, nor to assume overlapping and growing generations.
In the real world, Ponzi nance arises when lenders lend more than the expected
value of collateral and/or when they systematically over-estimate the long-term
value of collateral when there is an asset price bubble. There remains a ceiling
(higher than the interest rate) to the growth rate, because R&D investment should
not totally crowd out households consumption, which has to remain positive.10
Figure 1 below presents a graphical representation of the steady state with the
growth rate on the vertical axis and the interest rate on the horizontal axis.
Fig. 1. Equilibrium growth rates as a function of real interest rates.
We distinguish two cases of relative risk aversion of households: the rising line
starting from the value of time preference  = 1% with the higher slope rising
line corresponds to  = 0:5, the one with the lower slope corresponds to  = 2.
They show all possible growth rates for a given interest rate. The parameters for
innovative rms are set as follows: 
q
   = 5%,  = 1, 0 = 0:98. A vertical line
10If there are some rms that are not able to invest,  < 1, we get transitional dynamics for
the aggregate debt patent ratio. After an exogenous shock, convergence is regular without any
cyclical or chaotic patterns. Because of nancial constraints, however, the transitional dynamics
of the interest rate and of the marginal productivity is no longer necessarily the same.
on the left side of the gure represent the asymptote of the nancially constrained
patent growth rate: r = 
q
   = 1:25% for  = 0:25. On the right of this
asymptote, the patent growth curve for  = 0:25 is rst represented by a curve
decreasing with interest rate as long as:


q
   = 1:25% < r < 
q
   = 5%
with a growth rate higher than 0  1 = 2:9%. For growth rate below 0  1 =
2:9%, the patent growth rate curve is represented by a vertical line: r = 
q
   =
5%, because of the free entry condition in capital markets. We can consider four
steady state growth regimes (Table 1).
  1:25% < r  5% g
E1 2 0    1 5% = 
q
   2% < 0  1
F2 0:5 ! 0 2:5% 2:9% = 0  1
F3 0:5 25% 2:9% 3:8%
F4 0:5 ! 1 5% = 
q
   8; 1%
Table 1. Steady state growth rates and interest rates.
In equilibrium E1 there is a high relative uctuation aversion ( = 2) and con-
dition 2 is not fullled: the free entry steady state growth prevails. For equilibria
with a low relative uctuation aversion of households that is households do not
satisfy the bounded utility condition (23), the growth rate increases with , from
the no debtregime with  = 0 (F2), to the  = 25% (F3). The theoretical limit
case of perfect collateral ( = 100%) is not possible in practice with patents as
collateral, where the free entry growth rate level can be reached even when the
growth rate exceeds the real interest rate (F4).
Proposition 4: Policy e¤ects of Murphys (2002) legal reforms on
patents growth. Public expenditures may shift the economy from equilibrium
F2 to equilibrium F3, with a sharp increase of the growth of innovations.
Murphy (2002) proposes to raise public expenditures in the USPTO and in the
IPR public legal system in order to reduce the uncertainty surrounding the use of
patents as collateral for lenders and the costs of litigation on transfers of IPR, for
example, by funding a public registry of patents used as collateral. The proportion
of the value of patents transferred to lenders  (G=N) = 0 (G=N)
a (with 0 > 0
and with elasticity a > 0) increases with G=N , which measures public funding
per patent devoted to grease the wheels of the transfers of property rights in IPR
when patents are used as collateral (with 0 > 0). G=N is nanced by taxing
with a proportion  (0   < 1) the rent  of each patent currently registered at
the USPTO. An alternative public funding leading to similar results consists of a
corporate income tax with a deduction of interest payments. This taxation also
decreases the collateral market value of each patent by a factor (1  ). The tax
policy maximizing the growth of patents amounts to maximize the after tax rate
of return on equity of innovative rms (written in a way to simplify the derivative
with respect to the tax rate):
max

24r + (1  ) q   (r + )
1  0 ()a
(1 )
q
r+
35 :
The tax rate increases the proportion of the value of patents transferred to lenders,
but decreases the value of patents, and decreases the ow of prots. The trade-o¤
between the rst two e¤ects leads to the tax rate maximizing the debt/patent
ratio xc (at the denominator of the growth rate) which is
  =
a
1 + a
:
Because the tax rate also decreases the ow of prots and hence the growth
rate, the growth maximizing tax rate   is below the loan/patent ratio maximizing
tax rate: 0 <   <  . This solution is an interior solution as long as the after
tax prots remain positive, that is when:   1   q (r + ) =, else this upper
bound prevails as a corner solution. This corner solution disappears when one
taxes corporate income after interest payments. After tax prots (net of interest
payments) are then always positive. The growth maximizing tax rate   is given
by the implicit equation:

q
(1  xc ()) =

(1  ) 
q
  (r + )

@xc ()
@

:
The reform is such that the economy shifts from   0 (very few patent backed
loans, with a suboptimal level of public expenditures equal to zero: G=N =  = 0)
to a widespread practice of patent backed loans, with an aggregate loan to patent
ratio  ( ) =(1 + r), expected to be close to 25% in practice (Edwards (2002)).
This e¤ect of this policy is evaluated using the growth di¤erential following a
shift from equilibrium F2 to equilibrium F3: G ( ( ))   0. Under condition
2, satised by a low relative uctuation aversion, such as  = 0:5 in Example 2,
the policy e¤ect on the growth rate of innovation may be huge. The growth rate
increases from 2:9% to 3:9% and the interest rate increases from 2:5% to 2:9%.
Additional information can be gained when we compute the marginal e¤ect of
policy reforms on growth:
@GN
@
= ( (1 + r))
1

 1
@gN
@
@gC
@r
  @gN
@r
> 0 (24)
with
@gN
@
= 0


q
     r
 @x
@xc

q(r+)
(1  x)2 > 0:
A large e¤ect of a marginal change of the loan to patent ratio  is obtained for
a large gap between the equilibrium credit interest rate and the marginal return
on innovation. Graphically, the closer the equilibrium interest rate is to the value
of the real interest rate determining the vertical asymptote of the patent growth
curve, the larger the marginal e¤ect on growth of reducing the legal uncertainty
surrounding patents as collateral.
4. Conclusion
This paper describes an endogenous growth model with lenders limiting credit up
to the collateralizable value of existing patents and with a composition between
innovative rms facing a probability to nd a positive net present value R&D
investment opportunity or not each period.
First, at the entrepreneur level, nancial constraints and lumpiness lead to a
specic entrepreneurs savings behaviour where they build deep pocketsby antic-
ipating future nancial constraints. When a lumpy R&D investment opportunity
occurs, the dependence of the persistence of R&D investment on the mark-up
rewarding innovations is amplied by the debt/patent collateral constraint.
Secondly, the aggregation of entrepreneurs behaviour determines a steady state
endogenous aggregate leverage (or debt/patent ratio) below the leverage ceiling.
Thirdly, this nancially constrained steady state occurs only for relatively large
growth rates. In this regime, a large e¤ect on growth of reforms protecting lenders
using patents as collateral occurs for low values of the equilibrium interest rate
with respect to the rate of return on innovation; a factor which depends also on
the growth of credit supply and not only on the behaviour of innovative rms.
Extensions suggest that collateral assignment of patents may be detrimental
to open source, because it adds incentives to value patents portfolios. Leverage
driven growth is a necessary characteristic of high speed growth of innovation.
Appendix A. Proof of proposition 1
The Lagrangian of the entrepreneur program is:
(nt; bt) 2 ArgmaxE0
+1X
t=1
Lt
T=tT=1 (1 + rT )
with Lt =
 
1 + dt

dt + 
b
t (qx
cnt   bt)
+dt (  (1  0) (qnt 1  Rt 1bt 1))
where bt is the Lagrange multiplier related to the debt ceiling constraint, 
d
t is
the Lagrange multiplier related to the minimal consumption constraint, and with
consumption dt given by the ow of funds constraint:
dt = (qnt 1  Rt 1bt 1) + bt   qnt  

1it>0   1

q (nt   nt 1) :
The Euler equation on debt bt is @Lt@bt = 0, for any date t:
0 = 1 + dt   bt + Et
 
  (1 + rt)
 
1 + dt+1

+ dt+1 (1  0) (1 + rt)
1 + rt+1
!
)
dt = 
b
t   1 + (1 + rt)Et
 
1 + 0dt+1
1 + rt+1
!
:
The rst order condition with respect to the stock of patents is @Lt
@nt
= 0, that is:
0 =
 
1 + dt

( q) + qxcbt
+Et

1
1 + rt+1
 
1 + dt+1
 h
q +

1it+1>0   1

q
i
+Et

1
1 + rt+1

dt+1 (  (1  0)q) :
One divides by q and substitutes dt using the rst order condition for debt:
0 =  bt   (1 + rt)Et
 
1 + 0dt+1
1 + rt+1
!
+ xcbt
+

1 +

q
  

Et
 
1 + 0dt+1
1 + rt+1
!
+Et
 
1 + dt+1
1 + rt+1
!
1it+1>0   1

:
Hence:

q
     rt = (1  xc) 
b
t
Et

1+0dt+1
1+rt+1
 + Et
0@ 1 + dt+1 (1  1it+1>0)
1 + 0Et
d
t+1
1A :
The su¢ cient conditions as stated in Chow (1997), p.29, are also fullled, since
the functions are concave and either the Lagrange parameter is equal to zero and
the inequality condition not binding or the Lagrange parameter is di¤erent from
zero and the inequality condition is binding, see Chatelain (2000).
Appendix B. Logarithmic Utility for Entrepreneurs
This appendix considers the case where entrepreneurs maximize a (concave)
logarithmic utility, with a discount factor  = 1=(1 + 0) which may di¤er from
households discount factor11:
+1X
=0
 ln(dt+ ) (25)
subject to the ow of funds constraint, the collateral constraint, and the positive
consumption constraint dt  0. The Euler equation on debt bt is @Lt@bt = 0, for any
date t:
0 =

1
dt
+ dt

  bt +
Et

  (1 + rt)

1
dt+1
+ dt+1

1 + 0
)
dt = 
b
t  
1
dt
+ (1 + rt) Et

1
dt+1
+ dt+1

: (26)
11This discount factor plays the same role as the maximal saving rate of equity when entre-
preneursutility is linear
The rst order condition with respect to the stock of patents is @Lt
@nt
= 0, that is:
0 =

1
dt
+ dt

( q) + qxcbt
+q ()Et

1
dt+1
+ dt+1

+qEt

1
dt+1
+ dt+1

1it+1>0   1

:
One divides by q and substitutes dt using the rst order condition for debt:

q
     rt = (1  xc) 
b
t
Et

1
dt+1
+dt+1
1+rt+1
 + Et
0@ 1 + dt+1 (1  1it+1>0)
Et

1
dt+1
+ dt+1

1A :
a) Case where bt = 
d
t+1 = 0 and

1it+1>0 = 1, the Euler equation for patents
and on debt leads to:
dt+1
dt
=  =  (1 + rt) :
Hence rt 1 = q    = rt, so that the ow of funds constraint can be written as a
function of the entrepreneurs equity:
qnt   bt = Rt 1 (qnt 1   bt 1)  dt: (27)
Using the Euler equation for debt, one has:
Rt 1 = Rt 1   dt
qnt 1   bt 1 :
Hence:
dt = (1  ) (qnt 1   bt 1)
with the entrepreneurs net worth on date t dened by at = (qnt 1   bt 1). The
savings of an entrepreneur are a fraction  of her rm net worth at. A balanced
growth where the growth rate of households consumption is equal to the growth
factor of entrepreneurs consumption  is obtained when households utility is
also logarithmic with an identical discount factor  = , or in the particular case
where []
1
 = .
b) Case where bt > 0 and 
d
t+1 > 0 and

1it+1>0 = 1, rt 1 <

q
 : entrepreneurs
invest by borrowing up to the credit limit because the rate of return on their
R&D investment exceeds the real interest rate. The debt ceiling constraint can
be written as:
at+1 = qnt   (1 + rt) bt =

1   
q (r + )
1 + rt


qnt:
When the debt ceiling constraint binds, the ow of funds constraint can be written
as:
qnt =
qnt 1  Rt 1bt 1   dt
1  xc :
Hence, the entrepreneur net worth is:
at+1 =
 
1  xc 1+rt


1  xc (at   dt) :
Maximizing the log utility of dividends determined by the entrepreneur net worth
constraint implies that the saving of an entrepreneur is a fraction  of her rm
net worth at. When all rms do invest and are nancially constrained on date t
and date t   1, and the growth factor of patents is equal to the growth rate of
households consumption in the steady state, which may lead to an equilibrium
interest rate below its free entry level rt 1 < q   :


+


q
     rt 1

xc
1  xc

= [Rt 1]
1

under condition 2:
 < []
1
 :
When  = 1 (households utility is also logarithmic), then condition 2 means that
the discount factor of entrepreneurs is lower than the discount factor of households
 <  (entrepreneurs rate of time preference discount the future more heavily than
households).
Appendix C. Steady state debt/patent ratio
The law of motion of the debt/patent ratio xt as a function of its previous
value: xt =M (xt 1) is computed using the aggregate patent growth factor:
Nt
Nt 1
= G =

1  xc
0 ( Rt 1xt 1) + (1  ) (1  ) ; (28)
and the aggregate debt (or equity) law of motion, which can be written as:
Nt
Nt 1
= GF =
0 ( Rt 1xt 1)
1  xt = 
0

+

 Rt 1xt 1
xt

1
1  xt   1

:
The steady state leads to the implicit relation N(xt; xt 1) = GF  G = 0:
N(xt; xt 1) =
0 ( Rt 1xt 1)
1  xt  

1  xc
0 ( Rt 1xt 1)  (1  ) (1  ) = 0:
which can be written as this explicit equation:
xt = M (xt 1; rt 1) = 1  
0 ( Rt 1xt 1) 

1 xc

0 ( Rt 1xt 1) + (1  ) (1  )
= 1  1  x
c

0@1  1
1 +
 

1 xc
 0( Rt 1xt 1)
(1 )(1 )

1A : (29)
A su¢ cient condition for @M
@xt 1
< 1:
@M
@xt 1
=
0Rt 1 (1  ) (1  ) 

1 xc

0 ( Rt 1xt 1) + (1  ) (1  )
2 < 1
rt 1 <
1
0 (1  ) (1  )   1 <
G2
0 (1  ) (1  )   1) (30)
@M
@xt 1
< 1:
The steady state debt/patent ratio x is given by the following quadratic equation:
N (x; x)
0
=
 Rt 1x
1  x  

1  xc ( Rt 1x) 
(1  ) (1  )
0
= 0:
The function N (x; x) is continuous on the interval [0; xc] and strictly increasing:
@N (x; x)
@x
= 0

 Rt 1
(1  x)2 +

1  xcRt 1

> 0:
According to the intermediate value theorem, a unique solution exist for a positive
steady state debt/patent ratio 0 < x  xc < 1 under the conditions N (0; 0) < 0
and N (xc; xc) > 0. First, N (xc; xc) > 0 is always fullled as long as  < 1 :
N (xc; xc) = (1  )

0

+ ( Rt 1)

xc
1  xc

  (1  )

> 0:
Second, N (0; 0) < 0 leads to condition 2, such that  should not be to low:
N (0; 0) = (1  xc) [0  (1  ) (1  )]  0 < 0
) xc = 

q
r + 
> xcmin = (1  )

0  (1  )
0  (1  ) (1  )

:
Condition 2 for the steady state debt/patent ratio to be strictly positive implies
that the interest rate should be below the ceiling rmax:
r < rmax =

xcmin

q
  :
The explicit solution x is found by solving the quadratic equation N(x; x) = 0.
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